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WHEN WOMEN KILL NEWBORNS:
THE RHETORIC OF VULNERABILITY

Copyright © 2014. Cambridge Scholars Publisher. All rights reserved.

SUSAN AYRES

Neonaticide, the act of killing a newborn, is a global problem. This chapter
presents two pairs of vignettes as a way to explore jurisprudence regarding
women who commit acts of violence and to argue for the application of a
rhetoric of vulnerability as informed by the pre-Socratic concept of kairos,
or right-timing and due measure.
The case study approach illustrates the debate about whether women and
men should be viewed with equality (sameness) or difference (specificity).
In the context of neonaticide, some theorists urge that women who kill
must be viewed the same as men (as having agency and responsibility) in
order for women to claim their humanity and citizenship.1 Other theorists
urge that women who kill newborns should be viewed different from men
(as victims lacking agency) in order to qualify for a lesser offense such as
manslaughter, which is the approach taken by England and over twenty
other countries that have enacted Infanticide Acts (providing for the lesser
offense of manslaughter when a woman is charged with killing her child).2
This theoretical debate about sameness versus difference spans various
disciplines from law to psychology to sociology, but has practical legal
implications not only in criminal law, but in family law and the workplace.
The first part of this chapter presents vignettes that illustrate the
different approaches taken by the United States and England in cases of
neonaticide. The first pair of vignettes contrasts teenagers accused of
killing newborns; the second pair contrasts adult women accused of killing
newborns. In addition to illustrating two broad socio-legal approaches to
1

Candace Kruttschnitt and Kristin Carbone-Lopez, “Moving Beyond the
Stereotypes: Women’s Subjective Accounts of Their Violent Crime,” Criminology
44 (2006): 326; Belinda Morrissey, When Women Kill: Questions of Agency and
Subjectivity (London: Routledge, 2003), 24, 28-29.
2
Michelle Oberman, “A Brief History of Infanticide and the Law,” Infanticide:
Psychosocial and Legal Perspectives on Mothers Who Kill, ed. Margaret G.
Spinelli (Washington, D.C.: American Psychiatric Publishing, Inc.), 2003, 9.
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infanticide, both pairs of vignettes illustrate the sameness versus difference
treatment of women, and both implicate the paradox inherent in these two
different approaches. Zillah Eisenstein articulates the paradox as follows:
“When woman is treated the same as man, she challenges man’s
representation of specificity and is also denied her own specificity; when
she is treated as ‘different,’ she is made the ‘other.’”3
The second part of this chapter describes the rhetoric of vulnerability as
articulated by feminist legal scholar Martha Fineman.4 Vulnerability
provides an alternative to skirt the paradox of the sameness-difference
debate made in arguments for women’s equality. The rhetoric of
vulnerability, which emphasizes the universal aspects of dependence,
implicates the responsibility of the state to remedy vulnerability. This
chapter argues that the rhetoric of vulnerability may be considered as an
example of the practical wisdom of kairos, the Sophist concept that builds
on the concepts of right-timing and due measure.
The third part of this chapter re-examines neonaticide through the
kairic rhetoric of vulnerability, arguing for changes in state assets to
provide options for unwanted pregnancy (right-timing), and in the criminal
justice system’s laws and defenses regarding neonaticide (due measure).

Copyright © 2014. Cambridge Scholars Publisher. All rights reserved.

Vignettes of Mothers Who Kill Newborns
When the media reports stories of abandoned or killed newborns, society
typically assumes the mother was a teenager who experienced an
unwanted pregnancy. However, studies report that the median age of
women accused of neonaticide is around nineteen, so the mother may well
be an adult woman, possibly the mother of older children. The following
vignettes illustrate these two broad categories of teenagers and adult
women accused of killing newborns.

Teenaged Girls Who Kill Newborns
Nicole Beecroft, from Minnesota, was seventeen years old the summer
before her senior year in high school when she learned she was pregnant.
She concealed her pregnancy from her family and was turned away from a
pregnancy clinic when she sought an abortion because the clinic
3

Zillah Eisenstein, The Female Body and the Law (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1998), 199.
4
Martha Fineman, “The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human
Condition,” Yale Journal of Law and Feminism 20 (2008): 1-23.
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considered abortion a sin. She briefly considered dropping her baby off at
a hospital, but did not understand the provisions for legalized
abandonment under the state’s Safe Haven law. Instead, she continued to
conceal her pregnancy and gave birth alone. She went into a panic when
the baby was born and stabbed the baby about one hundred times. When
her friend told an adult that Nicole had given birth, it was too late. The
baby was found in a trash bin during a search of the house. After a bench
trial, Beecroft was found guilty of first degree murder and given a
mandatory sentence of life without the possibility of parole. Her case was
reversed and remanded by the Minnesota Supreme Court, which found that
state actors had interfered with Beecroft’s expert testimony.5
Compare Nicole Beecroft’s case to a similar case in England. Whereas
in the United States, women who conceal pregnancy and kill their
newborns are charged with murder (they are treated the same as other
defendants who kill), in England and over twenty other countries, women
who conceal pregnancy and kill their newborns are charged with a lesser
form of murder, a manslaughter offense called infanticide.6 Generally
women convicted of infanticide do not serve prison sentences at all, but
rather, receive counseling and supervision. In fact, in the past ten years,
none of the fifty-nine women convicted of infanticide in England have
served any prison time.7
In a case factually similar to Beecroft’s, an unnamed sixteen-year-old
in Hampshire, England stabbed her newborn to death. After the baby was
found in a trash bin at a railway station, the teenager pleaded guilty to the
lesser offense of infanticide and received a twelve-month community
supervision and youth rehabilitation order. In presenting her case, the
prosecutor said that the teenager had no criminal intent, but that her
actions were driven by panic and emotional and physical shock because
she was unaware of pregnancy. The judge who sentenced her commented,
“The law recognizes it is important for the court to act in a constructive
way and mercifully rather than concentrate on the punishment.”8
These two vignettes illustrate the paradox of the sameness/difference
approaches. In the American case, Beecroft was treated the same as men
5

Transcript of Record, State of Minnesota v. Nicole Marie Beecroft, File No. 82K1-07-2492 (Washington County District Court, Tenth Judicial District, April 27,
2007-December 1, 2008), Beecroft v. Minnesota, 813 N.W.2d 814 (2012).
6
Oberman, “Brief History,” 3, 9.
7
Andrew Robinson, “Mother Who Hid Stillborn Baby’s Body Walks Free,”
Yorkshire Post, December 17, 2010. 2010 WLNR 25020433.
8
Press Association News, “Girl, 16, Stabbed Newborn to Death,” October 12,
2010, 10/12/10 PAWIRE 16:28:32.
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who kill, and received a mandatory sentence of life without the possibility
of parole. However, the sentence designated and subordinated her gender
and her ability to exercise agency. The question Beecroft’s case presents is
whether we should view a minor who attempted to terminate an unwanted
pregnancy, but who was turned away by a pregnancy agency, as a
responsible agent deserving life without the possibility of parole? While
the United States Supreme Court is considering the constitutionality of
sentences of life without parole for minors who commit murder, the
rhetoric that most American neonaticide cases focus on, however, is not
the specificity of the mother, but the death of an innocent newborn.
In comparison, the English case of the unnamed sixteen-year-old
accused of abandoning her newborn in the trash at the railway station
applies a difference approach. The teenager was treated differently than a
man in being found guilty of infanticide. Theorists such as Belinda
Morrissey might argue that the prosecutor’s statements designated her as
an “other,” a victim lacking in agency. The question her case presents is
whether we should view all women accused of killing newborns as lacking
any intent or agency. Do sentences under the Infanticide Act hold women
accountable or responsible for their actions? Indeed, the English
Infanticide Act is based on a presumption that a woman is guilty of the
lesser offense of manslaughter because she is acting as a result of a
postpartum mental imbalance.9 She does not have to show that the mental
imbalance caused her to kill the newborn, just that she suffered from the
postpartum mental imbalance. The rhetoric in England focuses on
compassion for a woman who has “labored alone or in a frightening
environment with no access to proper medical care.”10 Although the public
commonly expects mothers who have committed neonaticide to be teens
or young women, this is not always the case, as the next set of vignettes
demonstrates.

Adult Women Who Kill Their Newborns
Dana Deegan was a twenty-five-year-old Native American woman, living
on a reservation in North Dakota with her common-law husband and three
children aged five and under. She had been brutally physically and
9

Oberman, “Brief History,” 8-9.
Judith Duffy, “A Newborn Baby Is Found Dead in a Pond. Another Was
Dumped in a Park. So Who Are the Mothers and Why Are They Abandoning Their
Own Children?” Sunday Herald (Glasgow), September 11, 2005. 2005 WLNR
14345860.
10
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sexually abused as a child and as an adult by both her father and husband.
She lived in poverty, and her husband spent money on drugs. When
Deegan became pregnant a fourth time, she denied the reality of her
pregnancy and sought no prenatal care. Because she was depressed and
overwhelmed, she did not believe she was pregnant. Instead, she denied
the pregnancy, or “put the pregnancy out of her mind,” according to the
psychiatrist who examined her. When she went into labor, she gave birth
alone in a dissociative state, an out-of-body sensation she had experienced
before as a girl when she had been sexually abused. After giving birth, she
abandoned the baby in her home. She returned several weeks later and put
the dead body in a suitcase out in a field, where a worker discovered the
suitcase. Eight years later, DNA evidence implicated Deegan, who
confessed and accepted a plea bargain for second degree murder. She was
sentenced under federal guidelines for 121 months—or about ten years.
The judgment was affirmed on appeal by the eighth circuit in an opinion
containing a fifty-nine page dissent.11
Dana Deegan’s case may be contrasted with a factually similar case of
Allison Johnson in South York, England. Allison Johnson was a thirtythree-year-old woman who had five other children. In June of 2000,
authorities discovered that she had abandoned two newborn babies by
putting them in laundry baskets in her garage. (She was turned in to
authorities by her sister who suspected that Johnson might be secretly
disposing of newborns.) Johnson pleaded guilty to infanticide and was
given a three year community rehabilitation order with psychiatric
counseling. In sentencing her, the judge considered that “she had been a
good and caring mother to her other children.” He also observed that she
was divorced at the time and under stresses of her mother’s illness and had
her own financial problems. Moreover, the judge stated that she was not
“wicked . . . [and that she did not] offer any obvious risk of reoffending
and [could] be safely managed in the community.” The judge concluded,
“Some psychological condition must have caused you to act as you did.”12
Similar to the first set of vignettes about teen mothers, this second set
demonstrates the paradox inherent in the sameness/difference approach to
treating women who kill their newborns. While American law treated
Deegan the same as a man (as a responsible agent who killed her
newborn), her specificity as a woman who had been repeatedly abused
11

United States v. Deegan, 605 F.3d 625 (2010).
Judge’s comments taken from two articles by Emma Dunlop published in the
Yorkshire Post on June 13, 2002, “Sister Had to Tell Police of Suspicions over
Babies’ Fate” and “Baby Killer Who Hid Body is Spared Jail,” wppw WLNR
3497189, 2002 WLNR 3481030.
12
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since the time she was a child, and who suffered denial and dissociation,
was not emphasized. Instead, the rhetoric surrounding the case focused on
the death of an innocent victim. For instance, in a flurry of postings on a
Law Prof Blog on Sentencing Law and Policy after Deegan’s judgment
was affirmed on appeal, one professor posted the following on May 26,
2010: “The obligation of a mother to care for her young children is the
most basic obligation known to the human race. If the law cannot enforce
that, there is nothing it CAN enforce”; “if society [sic] cannot set its face
against infanticide, it has just flat-out lost its moral bearings. It is
impossible to imagine a victim more innocent or defenseless than a baby.”
Thus, these vignettes illustrate that in the United States, the mother is
treated like other defendants accused of murder—or maybe worse because
she has killed a defenseless baby. Indeed, feminists note that American
women who commit crimes, especially crimes that intersect with family
law, receive disproportionately harsher treatment than men.13 For instance,
Deegan’s punishment of ten years’ imprisonment seems excessive, but
was based on federal sentencing guidelines. In contrast, in the English
case, Johnson was treated differently than a man; however, the presumption
that she acted because of hormonal imbalance after giving birth
constructed her as a victim and denied the possibility that she exercised
agency in abandoning not one, but two newborns in subsequent pregnancies.
Johnson’s punishment of three years’ community rehabilitation and
counseling seems inadequate to insure that she was held accountable and
responsible for her actions.
As these vignettes demonstrate, the criminal justice systems in United
States and England have very different ways of charging and punishing
neonaticide. In the United States, judges and jurors continue to convict
women who kill newborns of murder and impose harsh sentences, as
shown by the legal treatment of Beecroft and Deegan. In contrast, by the
nineteenth century, English juries became unwilling to convict women
who killed newborns under the concealment statutes and later murder
statutes.14 The creation of the English Infanticide Act in 1922 (amended in
1938) can thus be viewed as a practical response to juries’ and judges’
reluctance to hold women responsible for murder.15 So, even though the
13
Naomi Cahn, “Moral Arguments and the Dilemmas of Criminalization,” DePaul
Law Review 49 (2000): 822.
14
Mark Jackson, New-Born Child Murder: Women, Illegitimacy, and the Courts in
Eighteenth-Century England (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996),
113-18.
15
The same legal development may be traced in Canada, as Kramar and Watson
demonstrate in their historical analysis of the 1948 Canadian Infanticide Act
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United States has not followed suit by enacting infanticide laws that would
mitigate the killing of newborns from murder to manslaughter, the next
section of this chapter argues that the rhetoric of vulnerability provides an
alternative to the paradox of the sameness/different debate. Moreover, the
rhetoric of vulnerability is kairic in its pragmatic wisdom that emphasizes
the unequal circumstances and disparities of power for women who suffer
unwanted pregnancy that must be taken into account by the state in
responding to such vulnerabilities.

Copyright © 2014. Cambridge Scholars Publisher. All rights reserved.

The Rhetoric of Vulnerability
Vulnerability has been touted lately as a promising theoretical framework
to examine various socio-legal problems such as humanitarian emergencies,
animal law, and workplace discrimination. In her 2008 article on the
vulnerable subject, Martha Fineman applies Peadar Kirby’s concept of
vulnerability in order to fashion a more responsive state and egalitarian
society. She uses the term “vulnerable” not in a negative sense of
disability, but in the positive sense “for its potential in describing a
universal, inevitable, enduring aspect of the human condition that must be
at the heart of our concept of social and state responsibility.”16 We are all
vulnerable to change, to “harm, injury, and misfortune from internal and
external forces,” consequently, vulnerability is a “post-identity” analysis
because vulnerability is inherent in the human condition.17 Moreover,
although Fineman does not analyze the rhetoric of vulnerability through
the lens of kairos, her project shares many characteristics with the
rhetorical concept of kairos. This parallel highlights the pragmatic wisdom
of Fineman’s project.
Although Fineman’s previous scholarship argued for a notion of
substantive equality, her recent project rejects the concept of individuals as
liberal autonomous subjects. She now claims that “notions of
independence, autonomy, and self-sufficiency…are empirically unrealistic
and unrealizable,”18 especially in the regime of the family where
(Kirsten Johnson Kramar and William D. Watson, “Canadian Infanticide
Legislation, 1948 and 1955: Reflections on the Medicalization/Autopoiesis
Debate,” Canadian Journal of Sociology 33 (2008): 23. Available at 2008 WLNR
25855007).
16
Fineman, “Vulnerable Subject,” 8. Fineman refers to the work of Peadar Kirby,
Vulnerability and Violence: The Impact of Globalisation (London: Pluto Press,
2006).
17
Ibid., 9.
18
Ibid., 11.
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“structural family disadvantages associated with caretaking still typically
burden women more than men, even after decades of feminist equality
reform.”19 Thus, Fineman has made a pragmatic shift from the rhetoric of
substantive equality to the rhetoric of vulnerability because she finds it
“more theoretically promising.”20 Instead of describing individuals as
liberal autonomous subjects, Fineman draws upon the work of Kirby and
others who “have offered a model of interdependence in which the liberal
subject is enmeshed in a web of relationships and perceived as dependent
upon them.”21
One important aspect of the vulnerability analysis is that it avoids the
paradox inherent in the sameness-difference debate. Fineman emphasizes
dependence and vulnerability as a universal condition and thus side-steps
the problem of whether women should be viewed as autonomous agents
and treated the same as men, or as victims and treated differently than
men. The theoretical framework of vulnerability rejects the question about
whether women can be viewed as autonomous citizens because “the
benefits of citizenship are unevenly distributed through existing social and
cultural structures . . . [T]here is no level playing field.”22 Thus, Fineman
shifts the frame to decenter autonomy and replace it with vulnerability.23
Another important aspect of the vulnerability analysis is its implications
for social institutions. Fineman argues that assets conferred by the state to
provide individuals with resilience should be regulated to ensure that they
are equitable; indeed, the state should be held accountable in responding to
vulnerability.24 State assets include physical assets (physical or material
goods), human assets (health, education, employment), and social assets
(family, social groups, unions). Additionally, the criminal justice system
may also be considered a state asset.25 In making her argument that the
state must be held responsible for ensuring access and equal opportunity,
Fineman points to Canada and other Western countries that have accepted
the obligation of government “to guarantee fundamental social goods.”26

19
Martha Fineman, “Equality: Still Illusive After All These Years,” Gender
Equality: Dimensions of Women’s Equal Citizenship, eds. Linda C. McClain and
Joanna L. Grossman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 254.
20
Ibid., 255.
21
Fineman, “Vulnerable Subject,” 11.
22
Fineman, “Equality,” 257.
23
Ibid., 261.
24
Fineman, “Vulnerable Subject,” 14-15.
25
Ibid., 15.
26
Fineman, “Equality,” 261.
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Rhetorically, Fineman’s project has much in common with the preSocratic concept of kairos, as discussed below.

The Rhetoric of Vulnerability as Kairos

Copyright © 2014. Cambridge Scholars Publisher. All rights reserved.

The rhetoric of vulnerability may be examined for aspects of kairos, a preSocratic concept having many different meanings and components.
Contemporary rhetoricians have revived an interest in kairos and its rich
and complex dimensions. For example, Phillip Sipiora lists various
meanings of kairos in ancient Greece to include “‘symmetry,’ ‘propriety,’
‘occasion,’ ‘due measure,’ ‘fitness,’ ‘tact,’ ‘decorum,’ ‘convenience,’
‘proportion,’ ‘fruit,’ ‘profit,’ and ‘wise moderation.’”27 Likewise, James
Kinneavy describes the complex concept of kairos as “not easily reduced
to a simple formula,” but having various dimensions, such as ethical,
epistemological, rhetorical, aesthetic, and civic educational dimensions.28
Despite these various dimensions, kairos may be reduced to the two
concepts of right-timing and proper measure.29 Right-timing means the
“right time” to do something, not the linear or absolute time of chronos,
but a qualitative time, such as the right time to harvest grapes,30 or to
culture pearls.31 Kairos implicates timing in general, especially the three
features of a right time, a time of crisis, and a time of opportunity.32
The second aspect of kairos, proper measure, relates to justice and
ethics. As Kinneavy explains, “One of the most significant ethical
components of kairos had to do with its close relation to justice,
particularly in the Pythagoreans. Justice was defined as giving to each

27

Phillip Sipiora, “Introduction: The Ancient Concept of Kairos,” Rhetoric and
Kairos: Essays in History, Theory, and Praxis, eds. Phillip Sipiora and James S.
Baumlin (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002), 1.
28
James Kinneavy, “Kairos: A Neglected Concept in Classical Rhetoric,” Rhetoric
and Praxis: The Contribution of Classical Rhetoric to Practical Reasoning, ed.
Jean Dietz Moss (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press,
1986), 85-92.
29
Ibid., 85.
30
John E. Smith, “Time and Qualitative Time,” Rhetoric and Kairos: Essays in
History, Theory, and Praxis, eds. Phillip Sipiora and James S. Baumlin (Albany:
State University of New York Press, 2002), 52.
31
Amélie Frost Benedikt, “On Doing the Right Thing at the Right Time: Toward
an Ethics of Kairos,” Rhetoric and Kairos: Essays in History, Theory, and Praxis,
eds. Phillip Sipiora and James S. Baumlin (Albany: State University of New York
Press, 2002), 227.
32
Smith, “Time and Qualitative Time,” 52.
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according to merit.…Justice, therefore, was determined by circumstances.”33
The justice of kairos may also be illustrated by Plato’s emphasis on “virtue
as the mean between two extremes.”34 Timing and proper measure are
often inseparable, as Amélie Frost Benedikt comments about the ethical
dimension of kairos: “the right action at the wrong time is not kairic.
Neither is the wrong action at the right time kairic.”35 Instead, Benedikt
believes that the ethical component of kairos requires that we “take stock
of the entire situational context” in order to determine “the right moment
for an action.”36
The rhetoric of vulnerability, which imposes social responsibility on
the state, shares common features with the ethical dimension of kairos.
According to Sipiora, Isocrates was the first to incorporate “the theoretical
and pragmatic importance of kairos to rhetoric and social responsibility—
the ultimate goal of Isocratean paidei, or school.37 This pragmatic ethics
incorporated the concept of right timing in the sense that a citizen must
anticipate and respond to exigencies, and respond with practical wisdom in
a given situation.38 Thus, rather than applying “universals or ideals,” the
socially responsible citizen responded with flexibility to a contingent
universe.39 This same principal applies to the rhetoric of vulnerability,
which requires practical wisdom to respond to the exigency of vulnerability,
often a time of crisis. The rhetoric of vulnerability is kairic in its emphasis
on the responsibility of the state to fashion a more responsive and
egalitarian society by providing vulnerable citizens with assets for
resilience and by conferring state assets in a timely and equitable manner.
Like kairos, vulnerability is a rhetoric of possibility.40
Copyright © 2014. Cambridge Scholars Publisher. All rights reserved.

.

Reconsidering Neonaticide through a Rhetoric
of Vulnerability
Neonticide’s primary cause is unwanted pregnancy, and the act of
neonaticide occurs in a moment of vulnerability or crisis, such as the panic
Beecroft faced, or the dissociation Deegan experienced, at the moment of
33

Kinneavy, “Kairos,” 87.
Ibid., 88.
35
Benedikt, “On Doing the Right Thing,” 227.
36
Ibid., 229.
37
Sipiora, “Introduction,” 5.
38
Ibid., 9-10.
39
Ibid., 11, 13.
40
John Poulakos, “Rhetoric, the Sophists, and the Possible,” Communication
Monographs 51 (1984): 221, 223-24.
34
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childbirth. In previous work I have described the kairos of unwanted
pregnancies, which are “like other psychological crises” because they
“contain a continuum of kairic points of possible decision” in which a
mother may acknowledge the pregnancy and select a plan, or may deny the
existence of the pregnancy.41 In this chapter, I extend that analysis to argue
that society’s response to the vulnerability of unwanted pregnancy and
neonaticide may also be analyzed through the lens of kairos.
A rhetoric of vulnerability would examine Beecroft’s vulnerability as a
teenager (and not an adult),42 and her vulnerability in maneuvering through
social institutions in seeking an abortion. Likewise, the rhetoric of
vulnerability would focus on Deegan’s vulnerability as an abused wife
living in poverty with three young children, and living in a community
lacking important social resources, such as a battered women’s shelter.
These vulnerabilities demonstrate the need to “imagine responsive
structures whereby state involvement actually empowers a vulnerable
subject.”43
The following analysis considers social responses based on the dual
aspects of kairos: first, “right-timing” to provide human and social assets
for the vulnerability of unwanted pregnancy; and second, “proper
measure” to ensure that the criminal justice system provides equitable and
fair treatment of mothers accused of neonaticide.

Copyright © 2014. Cambridge Scholars Publisher. All rights reserved.

Right-Timing: Social Assets Providing Options
for Unwanted Pregnancy
One practical implication of the rhetoric of vulnerability is the state’s
responsibility to provide assets for resilience. In terms of unwanted
pregnancy, a kairic response would include providing options discussed
below, such as anonymous birth, legalized abandonment, adoption, and
abortion. This would offer women and teens such as Nicole Beecroft, who
unsuccessfully sought an abortion and briefly considered abandonment, a
legal alternative to avoid the tragic outcome of neonaticide and a sentence
of life without the possibility of parole.

41

Susan Ayres, “Kairos and Safe Havens: The Timing and Calamity of Unwanted
Birth,” William and Mary Journal of Women and the Law 15 (2009): 279.
42
Fineman, “Vulnerable Subject,” 11. Fineman notes that the liberal subject must
be presented as an adult, whereas the vulnerable subject can be in any
developmental stage.
43
Ibid., 19.
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Anonymous birth remains a foreign concept to most Americans, yet
France has had anonymous birth for many years and Austria recently
instituted it. In these countries which allow anonymous birth, a pregnant
woman about to give birth may register at the hospital without using her
own name, but instead as “Mother X,” and she may give birth safely with
attendants. The newborn is considered legally abandoned, and may be
placed for adoption.44 Anonymous birth provides a safer alternative to
giving birth unattended, as did the women in the vignettes, and many other
women facing unwanted pregnancy.
A related option found in the United States and a handful of other
countries, such as Germany, Italy, and Japan, is the use of baby flaps or
the legalized abandonment of infants. This option allows a parent to
anonymously abandon a newborn in a special incubator-like receptacle or
at a recognized agency, such as a hospital or fire department.45
Unfortunately, a primary obstacle to legalized abandonment is a lack of
social awareness. Although anonymous abandonment is legal in all fifty
states, many of these laws were enacted without funding provisions, and as
a result, most states provide no public awareness or education about legal
abandonment of newborns.46 For example, although Beecroft considered
legalized abandonment, she did not understand that she could
anonymously drop off her newborn at the hospital; rather, she believed she
needed to fill out paperwork required for adoption. Since she was
concealing her pregnancy, she did not believe filling out paperwork was a
viable option for her.
Likewise, another option for unwanted pregnancy is access to abortions
for teens and women who desire to terminate unwanted pregnancy. A
kairic rhetoric of vulnerability encourages states to put assets into access to
abortion and adoption, public awareness of existing safe haven laws, and
to enact other options such as anonymous birth. Such a kairic response
would give women facing unwanted pregnancy the option “do the right
thing at the right time.”47
Finally, a spectrum of other state assets could provide more resilience
for emotional and physical trauma related to unwanted pregnancy. This
might include battered women’s shelters for women, like Dana Deegan,
who was abused while pregnant, yet had no shelter at the reservation
where she lived. It might also include therapy and counseling for women

44

Ayres, “Kairos and Safe Havens,” 244-47.
Ibid., 239-40, 250.
46
Ibid., 252.
47
Benedikt, “On Doing the Right Thing,” 233.
45
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who abandon or kill newborns, which is the norm in countries such as
England. As one clinical psychologist indicated, “when we talk about
abandoned babies, there are abandoned mothers, too.”48 Finally, a kairic
rhetoric of vulnerability would encourage the reallocation of resources in
order to provide more funding to women stricken by poverty, such as Dana
Deegan, who felt overwhelmed by a fourth pregnancy.

Copyright © 2014. Cambridge Scholars Publisher. All rights reserved.

Proper Measure: The Criminal Justice System
as a State Asset
Criminal laws are an expression of moral outrage, and society generally
punishes more harshly the offenders it views as more culpable, and
punishes less harshly the offenders it views as more sympathetic. The
rhetoric of vulnerability emphasizes the unequal circumstances and
disparities of power for many women who have unwanted pregnancies.
For instance, Beecroft was a minor who was turned away when she sought
an abortion, and Deegan was an abused spouse who lived in poverty on a
reservation without a battered women’s shelter. Nonetheless, under current
American law, these vulnerabilities carried little weight in determining
sentences for murder of a newborn.
In contrast, English law and culture gives more weight to the
vulnerabilities of unwanted pregnancy and neonaticide. In sentencing both
the unnamed sixteen-year-old Hampshire girl and Allison Johnson, the
English courts took into account the vulnerabilities that caused their acts,
and recognized the need for a more therapeutic justice. The mother of
another English woman, Caroline Beale, who was charged for murder and
detained in the United States after allegedly committing neonaticide,
commented negatively about American system. Mrs. Beale stated, “‘I pity
any American girl that comes into this situation because the American
laws are medieval and they should be changed.’”49 As discussed above,
England’s infanticide laws were enacted when juries refused to convict
women of murder because society viewed these women more
sympathetically, or as more vulnerable. On the other hand, American
society does not share this sentiment, so state legislatures will be unlikely
to enact infanticide laws until there is social impetus to do so. The moment
is not kairic, but perhaps the rhetoric of vulnerability can effect change.
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Aside from enacting a new offense, such as an infanticide statute,
another possible response by the criminal justice system is to allow new or
re-tooled defenses to murder when a woman kills a newborn. Some
theorists, such as Michael Perlin, have argued for the availability of a
neonaticide syndrome.50 Neonaticide syndrome evidence would support a
defense, similar to the battered woman’s defense, that a woman such as
Deegan, who killed her newborn did not do so intentionally, but as a result
of psychological denial of her pregnancy and psychological dissociation
during the child’s delivery. This would provide a defense to intentional
murder charges.
Another possibility is the defense found in the Model Penal Code of
“extreme mental or emotional distress,” which mitigates murder to
manslaughter when the defendant acts under extreme mental or emotional
distress that would have caused a reasonable person standing in the
defendant’s shoes to commit the act.51 Arguably, a woman such as
Deegan, who gives birth alone after suffering an unwanted pregnancy that
she has denied, and who has been so abused in her life that she experiences
dissociation during the birth, may be a prime candidate for this mitigating
defense. Likewise, a teenager such as Beecroft, who lacks maturity to
navigate social services such as abortion providers, but who has tried to
cope with an unwanted pregnancy, might also be a candidate for the
mitigating defense of extreme mental or emotional distress, especially if
she endures childbirth alone and panics once the baby is delivered. Of
course, the Supreme Court’s upcoming decision regarding sentences of life
without parole for minors who commit murder would also impact cases
such as Beecroft’s.
A kairic rhetoric of vulnerability would encourage the criminal justice
system to respond to the vulnerability of neonaticide with justice and due
measure. For example, one practical implication involves the revision of
American criminal statutes to provide for an Infanticide Act or legally
recognized defenses when a woman is charged with murdering her
newborn. Another implication concerns a more therapeutic jurisprudence
to offer counseling and therapy for these vulnerable defendants.
An example of a kairic response to the vulnerability of unwanted
pregnancy and neonaticide occurred in Cyprus several years ago when a
twenty-year-old domestic worker, who had left Romania because she was
50
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in the socially untenable position of being pregnant and unmarried, killed
her newborn in Cyprus. Both the father of the child and Romanian society
had rejected her. So, she arrived in Cyprus a few days before her due date.
Then, she “gave birth alone to a baby boy and strangled him with her own
hands, placed the body in a bag, and threw it out of window of a house
where she lived and worked.”52 Like other women suffering unwanted
pregnancy, she lacked resources to cope with her vulnerabilities.
She was criminally charged with infanticide, an offense carrying up to
life imprisonment, but hers was the first infanticide case ever heard by
courts in Cyprus. It was a test case for the application of kairic righttiming and due measure. Ultimately, the Cyprus court gave her a probated
sentence of two years’ hospital supervision. In crafting the sentence, the
Cyprus court specifically turned to English law, not American law, to
reject the maximum sentence of life imprisonment.
An important question is why Cyprus chose the English approach,
which a news article described as providing “[c]ompassion, rather than
extended jail time.”53 The answer must lie in a constellation of legal and
social factors; however, it demonstrates the practical wisdom of
vulnerability. Instead of analyzing whether a woman who kills a newborn
should be treated the same as or different than a man who commits
murder, this approach focuses on the universal condition of the vulnerable
subject-object binary. The rhetoric of vulnerability side-steps the paradox
inherent in the sameness-difference debate about the treatment of women.
It allows for a case-by-case approach that provides a compassionate
response to vulnerability.
The result in this Cyprus case of neonaticide exemplifies the advice the
Sophist philosopher Isocrates gave centuries before to the King of Cyprus
in To Nicocles. Isocrates advised: “‘Do nothing in anger, but simulate
anger when the occasion [kairos] demands it. Show yourself stern by
overlooking nothing which men do, but kind by making the punishment
less than the offense.”54
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